On 5 September 1887, a fire broke out in the backstage area of the Theatre Royal in Exeter, England, during the production of The Romany Rye. The fire caused panic throughout the theatre, with 186 people dying from a combination of the direct effects of smoke and flame, crushing and trampling, and trauma injuries from falling or jumping from the roof and balconies.
The death toll makes it the worst theatre disaster, the worst single-building fire, and the third worst fire-related disaster in UK history.
Most of the dead were in the gallery of the theatre, which had only a single exit with several design flaws, and quickly became clogged with people trying to escape.
Construction of this Theatre Royal The previous Theatre Royal, Exeter had been gutted by fire in 1885, and the new theatre was opened, on a new site, in 1886 to the design of well-known theatre architect C. J. Phipps. The theatre was leased exclusively to Sidney Herberte-Basing.
The building was constructed from stone and red brick on the outside, but inside made extensive use of timber.
The licensing authority, Exeter City Council ordered that the new theatre be constructed "in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Metropolitan Board of Works", which was a statutory requirement in London under the Metropolitan Building Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122) (with theatre particulars added in the Metropolis Management and Building Acts Amendment Act 1878), but not in the regions.
In his letter accompanying the plans to the Corporation Surveyor of Exeter City Council, Phipps directly states that the building met all the rules and requirements laid out:
During the licensing inspection, the magistrates noted several deficiencies, which were ordered to be rectified, including installing an additional exit for the audience from the boxes, stalls, and pit, widening the exits to at least , changing some single leaf exit doors to double doors, and supplying of hose for each hydrant (of which there were only two – one in the foyer and one in the "prompts" in front of the stage), rather than which had been provided.
The magistrates did not make an inspection of the stage, the mezzanine floor, or the fly galleries above the stage.
The theatre's design contained a gallery, which was the audience viewing area at the top of the building containing the cheapest seats, to which access and egress was limited to a single stone staircase, which had four right-angled turns in it. Licensing magistrates noted during the licensing hearing that the Metropolitan Board rules stated that there should be two exits, but Phipps asserted that a second exit was provided by climbing the railing at the front of the gallery, and dropping to the second circle below. Unlike several other faults which were noted with clear instructions to remediate, it is unclear in documentation if the magistrates remarks about the exit required action, and the magistrates seemed to accept the assurances of the architect, issuing the licence.
The licensing requirements also specified the provision of an iron safety curtain, which was not fitted at the time of the fire. Similarly, a fire hydrant in the stage wings was on the plans of the theatre but never installed, despite Phipps being advised by Mssrs Merryweather, the installers of fire suppression measures, that the two hydrants installed were insufficient.
Performance and fire The play
The disaster occurred on 5 September 1887, the opening night of the touring production of the melodrama The Romany Rye written by George Robert Sims, performed by the company of Gilbert Elliott and produced by Wilson Barrett. The show had previously been staged at the Princess's Theatre in London.
The play had up to eighteen very elaborate sets and scenes, which were all stored around the backstage area.
There were 700 to 800 people in the Theatre Royal at the time of the fire, around half of its full capacity, with some 300 people in the gallery alone, which had been boosted by an influx of "half-timers" who entered after 9pm for a cheaper seat.
Fire breaks out
The fire broke out at approximately 10:20pm during the conclusion of the fourth act, when a gauze curtain was lowered from the gantry by a scene-shifter named Taylor, who then observed that the gauze had caught alight on one of the gas jets used for stage lighting. Upon seeing this, Taylor then ran across the gantry and released the "drop-scene" (a painting of Warwick Castle by Walter Johnson) towards the front of the stage, temporarily isolating the fire from the auditorium, and before the audience had noticed anything wrong.
The drop-scene covered the stage whilst the actor playing the part of Scragger was in the middle of speaking a line, and people in the theatre initially laughed, thinking there was a technical 'first-night' glitch in the performance.
The fire spread rapidly on scenery backstage, with the theatre fireman attempting to use a hose to extinguish it, but with no effect. The escape of the cast and crew meant the stage doors were opened, and this provided a draft that fanned the flames, and caused the drop scene – which had sheltered the audience to that point – to first bulge out, and then ignite.
Panic and attempted escape
The appearance of smoke and flame in the auditorium caused a mass panic, with patrons rushing for the exits. Those in the stalls and dress circle were easily able to escape through several easily accessed, wide exits. The higher upper circle had a wide stone staircase, as well as several secondary staircases, and whilst there were some crush injuries in the panic, most people were able to escape successfully.
Less fortunate were patrons in the pit area, where heavy crushing occurred from the movement of the crowd, and multiple lives were lost. Those trying to exit the pit found that one of their exits was locked and barred, and they were only saved when the hinges of the door gave way from the crushing pressure of the crowd.
Because the fire had been ignited by a gas lamp, the gas valves were shut off, but due to a further design flaw in the building, the shut-off cut the gas to all lighting in the building, including the lighting in the auditorium, and this meant that the audience trying to escape were plunged into darkness, and with the thick smoke visibility was severely restricted.
A number of deaths occurred when attendees from the Upper Circle attempted to descend the stairs they had entered by, but there was no signage or indication of which route was the exit, and they missed the opening for the exit stairs on a landing, and went straight ahead, finding themselves in the restaurant and bar, from which there was no escape.
The majority of the deaths occurred in the gallery, at the top of the theatre, where the single narrow staircase provided a bottleneck, worsened by the presence of a 'check-box' where patrons dropped their passes on the way out, directly at the top of the gallery stairway. In the darkness and smoke, the check-box was knocked down the stairs by the first rush of people, coming to rest at the first right-angle corner on the stairs, where it created a trip hazard, where people then fell over it, blocking the stairway, and causing a backlog of people and a crush as those behind pushed forward to reach the blocked exit.
The wife of the check-box attendant, Lucy Coombes, had come to meet her husband at the end of his shift but had arrived early. She was tripped by the falling checkbox and was trampled by the crowd. She was taken to hospital but died on the day that the inquest verdict was announced.
Some people did try to climb the railing to the upper circle (which the architect suggested as a valid second exit), but no-one is thought to have survived trying to exit in this way, all being overcome by smoke and fumes before successfully completing it.
Response to the fire
The fire brigade of the West of England Insurance Co was based only from the theatre, and Mr R Harry, who worked for the Exeter Tramway Company had left the New North Road depot near the fire station when he saw smoke issuing from the building, and ran back to the fire station to alert them. By chance, Mr Harry had also been the person to raise the alarm when the first Theatre Royal burnt down two years previously. This rapid alert meant that they responded about five minutes after the blaze started with their "Little West" fire engine.
Ladders were brought by members of the public from a local builder's yard, and several people were successfully rescued using the ladders to bring them from the gallery down to the balcony of the upper and dress circles.
After around ten minutes, a rumour circulated in the crowd that everyone was out of the building. The responding firefighters, having managed to get water on the outside of the building now managed to make entry to the building, and only then saw the scale of the disaster. On approaching the gallery stairs, they saw forty to fifty people in a heap on the exit stairs, dead or dying.
Other fire brigades from across the city also attended, including the Army brigade from Higher Barracks, and the railway brigade of the London and South Western Railway. A number of people were on the roof awaiting rescue, but the city's wheeled ladder was delayed in arriving from the Guildhall as it was chained up for security, and the keyholder could not be located for some twenty minutes.
Firefighters from Topsham saw the blaze from away, and set off to attend, but their horse had been turned out to graze, and could not be caught, and so they set off pulling their engine by hand. The horse was eventually captured, and caught up with the firefighters about halfway on their journey, then being harnessed to the appliance to continue the journey. The Topsham brigade would later receive a commendation from the Home Secretary for their bravery during the response.
The fire was beyond the capability of the firefighters, and they had to retreat from the flames. A group of rescuers, including soldier Driver George Cooper, and sailor Seaman William Hunt, climbed over a small roof and broke a window, pulling several people to safety.
Soldier Bombardier Frank Scattergood rescued a number of people from the building, including a child extra whom he found alone and terrified on the stage, before being overcome by smoke. He suffered severe burns before being pulled out of the building himself, and taken to hospital, where he died a few days later.
A number of people remained trapped on the roof or on the balconies of the building, but the fire's spread overtook many of these before rescuers could reach them, some choosing to jump to the street rather than be reached by the flames.
The last survivor was a woman found crouching in the saloon passage, and pulled out through a window at just after 11pm.
The landlord of the nearby New London Inn, Robert Pople, responded at the first alarm, bringing five or six ladders which saved many people, and then opened his premises, using the pub to shelter the survivors, and laying out victims in the stables. His actions during the fire were widely reported, including by The Illustrated London News, and he was praised. He was presented with a silver and gold bracelet by the Earl of Portsmouth the following month. This popularity saw him elected Sheriff of Exeter in 1890, followed by Alderman, and later he was elected Mayor of Exeter three times.
The police also attended, with a Constable Ching being noted for making a number of successful rescue efforts into the building with a handkerchief over his mouth.
Outcome
By the morning following the fire, more than 130 bodies were laid out at the New London Inn. Large local fabric retailer Colsons sent its entire stock of calico to the inn to help wrap the bodies of the dead.