In philosophy, metaethics (meta-ethics) is the study of the nature, scope, ground, and meaning of moral judgment, ethical belief, or values. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics (questions of how one ought to be and act) and applied ethics (practical questions of right behavior in given, usually contentious, situations).
While normative ethics addresses such questions as "What should I do?", evaluating specific practices and principles of action, metaethics addresses questions about the nature of goodness, how one can discriminate good from evil, and what the proper account of moral knowledge is. Similar to accounts of knowledge generally, the threat of skepticism about the possibility of moral knowledge and cognitively meaningful moral propositions often motivates positive accounts in metaethics. Another distinction is often made between the nature of questions related to each: first-order (substantive) questions belong to the domain of normative ethics and applied ethics, whereas metaethics addresses second-order (formal) questions.
Some theorists argue that a metaphysical account of morality is necessary for the proper evaluation of actual moral theories and for making practical moral decisions; others reason from opposite premises and suggest that studying moral judgments about proper actions can guide us to a true account of the nature of morality.
Metaethical questions According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, there are three kinds of metaethical questions: What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments? (moral semantics) Asks about the meanings of such words as 'good', 'bad', 'right', and 'wrong' (see value theory) What is the nature of moral judgments? (moral ontology) Asks questions of whether moral judgments are absolute or relative, of one kind or many kinds, etc. How may moral judgments be supported or defended? (moral epistemology) Asks such questions as how we can know if something is right or wrong, if at all. Garner and Rosen say that answers to the three basic questions "are not unrelated, and sometimes an answer to one will strongly suggest, or perhaps even entail, an answer to another". A metaethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not attempt to evaluate specific choices as being better, worse, good, bad, or evil; although it may have profound implications as to the validity and meaning of normative ethical claims. An answer to any of the three example questions above would not itself be a normative ethical statement.
Moral semantics
Moral semantics attempts to answer the question, "What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?" Answers may have implications for answers to the other two questions as well.
Cognitivist theories Cognitivist theories hold that evaluative moral sentences express propositions (i.e., they are 'truth-apt' or 'truth bearers', capable of being true or false), as opposed to non-cognitivism. Most forms of cognitivism hold that some such propositions are true (including moral realism and ethical subjectivism), as opposed to error theory, which asserts that all are erroneous.
Moral realism Moral realism (in the robust sense; see moral universalism for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about robust or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Metaethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "anti-realism" regarding moral facts: ethical subjectivism, error theory, or non-cognitivism. Realism comes in two main varieties:
Ethical naturalism holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are reducible or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as supervenience) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many modern ethical theorists, particularly utilitarians. Ethical non-naturalism, as put forward by G. E. Moore, holds that there are objective and irreducible moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have intuitive or otherwise a priori awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's open question argument against what he considered the naturalistic fallacy was largely responsible for the birth of metaethical research in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Ethical subjectivism Ethical subjectivism is one form of moral anti-realism. It holds that moral statements are made true or false by the attitudes and/or conventions of people, either those of each society, those of each individual, or those of some particular individual. Most forms of ethical subjectivism are relativist, but there are notable forms that are universalist: Ideal observer theory holds that what is right is determined by the attitudes that a hypothetical ideal observer would have. An ideal observer is usually characterized as a being who is perfectly rational, imaginative, and informed, among other things. Though a subjectivist theory due to its reference to a particular (albeit hypothetical) subject, Ideal Observer Theory still purports to provide universal answers to moral questions. Divine command theory holds that for a thing to be right is for a unique being, God, to approve of it, and that what is right for non-God beings is obedience to the divine will. This view was criticized by Plato in the Euthyphro (see the Euthyphro problem) but retains some modern defenders (Robert Adams, Philip Quinn, and others). Like ideal observer theory, divine command theory purports to be universalist despite its subjectivism.
Error theory Error theory, another form of moral anti-realism, holds that although ethical claims do express propositions, all such propositions are false, as the properties discussed don't exist (moral goodness, virtue, evil, etc). Thus, both the statement "Murder is morally wrong" and the statement "Murder is morally permissible" are false, according to error theory. J. L. Mackie is the best-known proponent of this view. Since error theory denies that there are moral truths, error theory entails moral nihilism and, thus, moral skepticism; however, neither moral nihilism nor moral skepticism conversely entail error theory.
Non-realist cognitivism Non-realist cognitivism (or non-metaphysical non-cognitivism) is a form of cognitivism that holds that (i) moral propositions are irreducibly normative truth-apt beliefs, (ii) some moral propositions are true, and (iii) no moral proposition is "made true by describing, or corresponding to, how things are in some part of reality". Non-realist cognivism's proponents, such as Derek Parfit, maintain it is different from non-naturalist realism in making no ontological commitment to moral entities. Parfit claims normative truths are not made true by anything that exists "either as natural properties in the spatio-temporal world, or in some non-spatio-temporal realm". Consequently, normative truths would not be contingent on a truthmaker. This contradicts Truthmaker Maximalism, the truthmaker theory that all truths must have one. Parfit explains this by claiming necessity, mathematical, and logical claims are also true in this way, stating:If we are Non-Realist Cognitivists, we deny that [...] logical and modal claims are made to be true by there being some part of reality which these claims correctly describe, or to which they correspond. If there is any dependence here, this dependence would go the other way. It would be reality that must correspond to these truths. Not even an omnipotent God could have made it false that two plus two equals four.Farbod Akhlaghi, Evan Jack and Mustafa Khuramy, and others call truths that also do not have truthmakers "partners in innocence". Akhlaghi believes a successful partner-in-innocence would show both that (1) Truthmaking Maximalism is false and (2) normative truths are not made true, if and only if both: (i) the successful partner-in-innocence lacks a truthmaker and (ii) "the best explanation for why they lack truthmakers show that there is no relevant disanalogy with normative propositions that prevents NRC from appealing to them."Akhlaghi, Farbod. "Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating". Ethics. 132 (2): 26 – via PhilArchive. While Akhlaghi grants (i) for logical truths, analytic truths, negative-existential truths and past/future truths, and modal / metaphysically necessary truths, he thinks none meets (ii) and therefore none is a successful partner-in-innocence.
Akhlagi claims logical truths do not meet (ii) because the best explanation for why truths about the property of validity—such as the truth that "<modus ponens is valid>"—lack any truthmaker is "the prima facie plausible thought that the property of validity is reducible to something like the relations amongst the contents of the propositions in some argument."Akhlaghi, Farbod. "Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating". Ethics. 132 (2): 27 – via PhilArchive. Akhlaghi contends non-realist cognitivism denies any such reduction for normative truths, as denying any such reduction is part of why non-realist cognitivism is a form of non-naturalism about normativity and not denying any such reduction would collapse non-realist cognitivism into a form of reductive naturalism about normativity.
Akhlaghi and others believe that non-realist cognitivism is an attractive theory because: (1.) it offers an alternative to traditional non-naturalism by avoiding metaphysical objections against it that many take to be decisive; (2.) it offers an alternative to Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard's Quasi-Realism, which many have rejected due to its non-cognitivism; (3.) if successful, it would reveal entirely misguided the strong motivation for naturalism and error theories: non-naturalism's seeming incompatibility with naturalism about reality more generally.
Non-cognitivist theories Non-cognitivist theories hold that ethical sentences are neither true nor false because they do not express genuine propositions. Non-cognitivism is another form of moral anti-realism. Most forms of non-cognitivism are also forms of expressivism, however some such as Mark Timmons and Terrence Horgan distinguish the two and allow the possibility of cognitivist forms of expressivism. Non-cognitivism includes: Emotivism, defended by A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, holds that ethical sentences serve merely to express emotions. Ayer argues that ethical sentences are expressions of approval or disapproval, not assertions. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Boo on killing!". Quasi-realism, defended by Simon Blackburn, holds that ethical statements behave linguistically like factual claims and can be appropriately called "true" or "false", even though there are no ethical facts for them to correspond to. Projectivism and moral fictionalism are related theories. Universal prescriptivism, defended by R. M. Hare, holds that moral statements function like universalized imperative sentences. So "Killing is wrong" means something like "Don't kill!" Hare's version of prescriptivism requires that moral prescriptions be universalizable, and hence actually have objective values, in spite of failing to be indicative statements with truth-values per se.
Centralism and non-centralism